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INTRODUCTION 
Advocates for some form of original understanding as the 
proper means for interpreting the Constitution managed to set 
the terms of the interpretive debate for nearly the last three 
decades. In part, their success is due to the perception that “it 
takes a theory to beat a theory.”3 Indeed many liberal legal 
scholars, Jack Balkin most recently, have simply decided to beat 
originalists at their own game by invoking history to justify 
Supreme Court decisions thought to be beyond redemption as a 
matter of original understanding.4 Paraphrasing Jefferson, then, 
are we all originalists now?5 David Strauss’s The Living 
Constitution answers with a resounding No! 
Since the 1996 publication of his article, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation,6 Strauss has labored to create an 
 
 1.  Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
 2.  Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. Thanks to Ben 
Barton, Brian Bix, and the students in my Contemporary Constitutional Theory seminar 
for comments on an earlier version of this article. Katie Terry provided helpful research 
assistance. 
 3.  For a version of this argument, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989). 
 4.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
 5.  Cf. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 14, 1801), in 1 
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (2000).  
 6.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
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alternative to originalism. In a series of articles, he argued that 
constitutional interpretation emulating the common law method 
(hereinafter “common law constitutional interpretation” or 
“CLCI”) is superior to originalism, both normatively and as a 
description of what the Court, in fact, does in most cases.7 The 
Living Constitution synthesizes his writings and provides, with 
admirable brevity, an interpretive alternative to originalism. 
After Strauss, no one can say that originalism’s opponents lack a 
theory. The question rather is whether CLCI “beats” originalism 
by compensating for the latter’s shortcomings without proving to 
have theoretical shortcomings itself. 
As I argue below, I think that Strauss’s case falls short. He 
devotes little space to explaining what, exactly, CLCI is and how 
it should be applied by courts. Strauss then contrasts CLCI with 
a caricatured originalism that bears little resemblance to the 
sophisticated theories of original understanding propounded by 
scholars today. In Part II, I offer my critique. Specifically, I 
question some of the assumptions underlying CLCI, note the 
absence of any definition of the “common law method,” and 
argue that his objections to originalism are not particularly 
persuasive. Ultimately, I conclude that we do not have enough 
information about CLCI to determine whether it is, in fact, 
superior to theories of original understanding (as opposed to the 
straw-man version of originalism Strauss offers) in most cases. A 
brief conclusion follows. 
I. THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Strauss lodges two main objections to originalism—the 
undesirability objection and the impossibility objection. 
Originalism is normatively undesirable because what we know 
the Framers did intend is morally or politically unacceptable to 
twenty-first century Americans. Originalism also requires 
submission to the (often morally inferior) choices of men long-
dead and is undesirable for that reason as well. 
 
REV. 877 (1996). 
 7.  David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 845 (2007); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and 
Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech 
and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE 
MODERN ERA 32 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); David A. Strauss, 
The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
!!!DENNING-273-COMMONLAWCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)11/17/2011 2:48 PM 
2011] BOOK REVIEWS 623 
 
Originalism, moreover, is impossible because (1) it is 
beyond the capacity of judges to discern what the Framers and 
Ratifiers understood the words of the Constitution to mean; and 
(2) even if judges could, they could not use those meanings to 
decide contemporary constitutional controversies. Because 
originalism is impossible, Strauss argues that judges who claim to 
employ originalism are simply reading their policy preferences 
into the Constitution. 
In contrast to originalism, Strauss argues that CLCI is 
workable, justifiable, descriptively superior, and candid. His 
theory is workable because it is within the capacity of judges. 
CLCI is justifiable because it relies on something other than 
blind obedience to the past. Further, he argues, it is descriptively 
superior because it reflects what the Court does and has done—
thus giving a better account of Court practices than originalism. 
It is, he avers, the only source for real constitutional change in 
our system. Finally, he argues that CLCI beats originalism on 
candor because his theory is transparent and honest, as opposed 
to opaque and obfuscatory—characteristics Strauss ascribes to 
originalism. 
A. THE UNDESIRABILITY OBJECTION 
Originalism is defined by Strauss to be “the view that 
constitutional provisions mean what the people who adopted 
them—in the 1790s or 1860s or whenever—understood them to 
mean” (p. 3). Originalism, Strauss argues, “is not consistent with 
principles that are at the core of American constitutional law, 
and, for the most part, originalists do not claim otherwise” (p. 
17).8 On cue, Chapter 1 issues forth a parade of horribles—“what 
we would have to give up if we were all to become originalists” 
(p. 12): 
 “Racial segregation of public schools would be 
constitutional.” (p. 12). 
 “The government would be free to discriminate against 
women.” (p. 13). 
 “The federal government could discriminate against racial 
minorities (or anyone else) pretty much any time it wanted 
to.” (p. 14). 
 “The Bill of Rights would not apply to the states.” (p. 15). 
 
 8.  By “American constitutional law,” of course, Strauss means the law as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 
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 “States could freely violate the principle of ‘one person, 
one vote’ in designing their legislatures.” (p. 15). 
 “Many federal labor, environmental, and consumer 
protection laws would be unconstitutional.” (p. 16). 
Strauss also objects that originalism violates Jefferson’s 
injunction that the earth belongs to the living. “One generation,” 
he writes, “cannot bind another” (p. 24). “Why should we be 
required to follow decisions made hundreds of years ago by 
people who are no longer alive?” (p. 18). Twenty-first century 
Americans have little in common with their ancestors of two 
centuries past—in fact, we have more in common with “present-
day residents of New Zealand[,] . . .  [b]ut it would be bizarre to 
suggest that we should let the people of New Zealand decide 
fundamental questions about our law” (p. 24). So “[w]hy do we 
submit to the decisions of the much more distant and alien 
founders” (p. 24)? Strauss rejects any answer that depends on 
“quasi-religious notions like fidelity,” and he argues instead that 
we should “adapt[] the Constitution to modern circumstances” 
when such adaptation is required (pp. 24–25). To the extent 
originalism would prevent this, he argues that Jefferson’s 
objection is “ultimately fatal to originalism” (p. 25). 
B.  THE IMPOSSIBILITY OBJECTION 
Equally flawed, for Strauss, is originalism’s methodology. 
“On the most practical level,” he writes, “it is often impossible to 
uncover what the original understandings were . . . .” (p. 18). To 
be done correctly, originalism means “judges have to be 
historians”—better, in fact, because historians get to choose 
what period of time that they study (p. 19). Lawyers and judges 
“have no apparent qualifications for it,” and “there is no reason 
to think that lawyers will be good at understanding the political 
culture of a distant century” (p. 20). More often, lawyers and 
judges produce law office history by picking and choosing among 
uncertain evidence and seeing in it “what the judge wants to see” 
(p. 20). By contrast, CLCI “requires judges and lawyers to be, 
well, judges and lawyers” (pp. 43–44). 
But even if history is available to judges and justices, it is 
not much help because “we would be faced with the task of 
translating those understandings so that they address today’s 
problems” (p. 18). For example, Strauss asks about the Equal 
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Rights Amendment to the Constitution (ERA):9 “Would the 
ERA have abolished all-girls and all-boys public schools? Would 
it have required public employers to give women pregnancy 
leave?” (p. 19). He claims that no “‘understanding’ emerged on 
questions like these. And if we cannot identify clear 
understandings about something so recent, we have very little 
chance of accurately uncovering the original understandings of 
something like the Bill of Rights” (p. 20). 
 The inability of originalism to deliver what it promises 
means that judges who purport to use originalism to fix 
constitutional meaning are relying on something else—their own 
values and preferences. Strauss assumes, for example, that 
Heller10 can be explained not as a good faith disagreement over 
ambiguous historical evidence but only as Justices invoking 
history as a fig leaf to support their preferred policy positions on 
gun control (pp. 20–21). Originalism, he concludes, “is not 
actually a way of interpreting the Constitution. It is a rhetorical 
trope” but one that has thrived for lack of a competitor (p. 31). 
C. THE SUPERIORITY OF CLCI 
Strauss argues that the Supreme Court does not usually 
decide constitutional cases by a close reading of the text and 
careful dissection of competing historical claims about textual 
meaning. Rather, the Justices debate what prior cases require 
(pp. 33–34). This common law approach is one “in which 
precedents evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good 
policy” (p. 36). Strauss maintains that CLCI restrains judges 
better than originalism (p. 36). In addition, he offers four 
reasons to prefer CLCI to originalism: workability, justifiability, 
descriptive superiority, and candor (pp. 43–44). 
1. Workability—CLCI answers the impossibility objection to 
originalism by embracing an interpretive method that is within 
the professional competence of lawyers and judges. Unlike 
originalism, Strauss argues, CLCI is workable because it only 
requires judges and lawyers to be judges and lawyers instead of 
historians (p. 43). “Reasoning from precedent, with occasional 
resort to basic notions of fairness and good policy, is what judges 
 
 9.  The ERA provided that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d 
Cong. (1972).  
 10.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (invalidating D.C. gun 
control ordinance on Second Amendment grounds). 
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and lawyers do” (p. 43). It is, he argues, their comparative 
advantage, not doing history. CLCI also answers part of the 
undesirability objection—that originalism would produce 
unacceptable results—because CLCI permits the introduction of 
contemporary values necessary to update or “modernize” the 
law.11 
2. Justifiability—For Strauss, CLCI also answers another 
aspect of the undesirability objection to originalism: that it 
requires subordination of the present to the dead hand of the 
past. “The common law ideology gives a plausible justification 
for why we should follow precedent” (p. 43). Instead of rooting 
its authority in the command of some sovereign, the authority of 
law under the common law approach “comes instead from the 
law’s evolutionary origins and its general acceptability to 
successive generations. Legal rules that have been worked out 
over an extended period can claim obedience for that reason 
alone” (pp. 37–38). The common law, in other words, can be 
thought to embody the wisdom of the ages, as adjusted from 
time to time by contemporary injections of “fair[ness]” or “good 
social policy” (p. 38). By contrast, originalists “do not have an 
answer to Jefferson’s question: why should we allow people who 
lived long ago, in a different world, to decide fundamental 
questions about our government and society today?” (p. 44). 
3. Descriptive Superiority—CLCI, not originalism, Strauss 
argues, represents the dominant mode of Supreme Court 
decision-making. Most of the constitutional principles we take 
for granted today came because the Court ignored original 
intent. “In controversial areas at least . . . the governing prin-
ciples of constitutional law are the product of precedents, not of 
the text or the original understandings. And in the actual 
practice of constitutional law, precedents and arguments about 
fairness and social policy are dominant” (p. 44).12 In Chapter 3, 
 
 11.  Cf. David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 859 (2009). 
 12.  Strauss also notes that these important changes came as a result of judicial 
decision-making, not constitutional amendment, leading him to conclude that formal 
amendments “are actually not a very important way of changing the Constitution” (p. 
115). He notes that the most important changes—flow of power to the federal 
government, the rise of the administrative state, growth of presidential power—have 
occurred in the absence of formal language in the Constitution (pp. 120–21). Moreover, 
occasionally formal amendments have failed to produce the changes anticipated. The 
Civil War amendments, for example, were all but moribund for decades after their 
ratification (p. 127). Formal amendments are, in his estimation, neither necessary nor 
sufficient to produce small-c constitutional change. The Court’s exercise of judicial 
review is the dominant mode of constitutional change, he argues. For a longer version of 
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for example, Strauss takes the reader on a Cook’s Tour of First 
Amendment doctrine from the World War I-era Espionage Act 
cases13 to the Pentagon Papers case14 (pp. 62–75) to illustrate that 
“[t]he law of the First Amendment is a creation of the living 
Constitution” (p. 76). “The central features of First Amendment 
law were hammered out in fits and starts, in a series of judicial 
decisions and extrajudicial developments, over the course of the 
twentieth century” (p. 53). Concern with original intent is 
noticeably absent in much First Amendment case law, he argues: 
“[T]he text and the original understandings of the First 
Amendment are essentially irrelevant to the American system of 
freedom of expression as it exists today” (p. 55).15 
4. Candor—Finally, Strauss argues that CLCI “is more 
candid” than originalism (p. 44). “The common law approach 
explicitly envisions that judges will be influenced by their own 
views about fairness and social policy” and that they have 
“operated that way for centuries” (p. 45). He denies this means 
that “judges can do what they want,” because they can only 
operate in “the area left open by precedent, or in the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to overrule a precedent” 
(p. 45). Originalists say that such appeals to judges’ personal 
values are illegitimate; “[a]n originalist has to insist that she is 
just enforcing the original understanding of” the constitutional 
provision she happens to be interpreting (p. 45). But this, he 
argues, “is an invitation to be disingenuous,” because of the 
impossibility objection described above (p. 45). Many 
controversial provisions are indeterminate and “it will be 
difficult for any judge to sideline his strongly held views about 
the issue” (p. 45). 
 
his argument, see Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, supra note 7. 
For a reply, see Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional 
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247 (2002). 
 13.  See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 14.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 15.  For example, though addressed to “Congress,” the First Amendment applies to 
the states and to the federal executive and judicial branches (p. 56). See, e.g., Mark P. 
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986). 
Moreover, historians have argued for decades over whether the freedom of speech 
protected by the Amendment extended only to seditious libel (pp. 58–59). See generally 
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8–13 (3d ed. 2010) (providing a brief 
overview of historical debates surrounding the purpose of the Amendment). 
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D. AN ANTICIPATED OBJECTION AND A CONCESSION 
In laying out the case for CLCI, Strauss anticipates one 
objection to his method: that it is anti-democratic. He also 
concedes that CLCI does not render either text or history 
entirely irrelevant to constitutional law; it just does so for the 
most controversial issues. 
Strauss acknowledges that an obvious difference between 
the traditional common law method and CLCI is that when 
courts render decisions applying the former, legislatures are free 
to overrule them by statute. “A decision about the meaning of 
the Constitution, by contrast, cannot be reversed by Congress or 
a state legislature; it can only be undone if the courts change 
course, or if the Constitution is formally amended . . . .” (p. 46). 
He denies that this charge of CLCI being anti-democratic is a 
“fatal defect” in his theory (p. 46). The problem, as he sees it, is 
not CLCI, but judicial review itself, “the practice of allowing the 
courts to have the last word on most issues of constitutional law” 
(p. 47). Further, there is the Constitution, which, by design, “will 
sometimes prevent the majority from having its way . . . .” (p. 
47). 
For Strauss, once you accept constitutionalism, and the role 
of the Supreme Court in settling disputes over its meaning, the 
anti-democratic or counter-majoritarian charge loses much of its 
force. “The common law is not intrinsically democratic or 
undemocratic; it is a way of resolving legal issues” (p. 47). 
Moreover, it is a way of resolving legal issues in the here and 
now, involving new questions not previously considered. 
Originalism is not any more democratic, he argues, because it 
requires present-day majorities to submit themselves to the rule 
of the long-dead. “Apart from that,” Strauss adds, “originalist 
judges have to decide what those people’s will was about issues 
that the people could not have anticipated—and that leaves 
plenty of room for undemocratic rule by judges” (p. 49). He 
adds, for good measure: “in any event, we do not have a purely 
democratic system. We have a system in which the courts, 
applying the Constitution, sometimes prevent the majority from 
having its way” (p. 49). 
Strauss concedes that text and history are sometimes 
important—decisive even—in fixing constitutional meaning. 
CLCI, in other words, does not mean that courts would be free 
to “interpret[]” the age limits for elected officials to mean 
!!!DENNING-273-COMMONLAWCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)11/17/2011 2:48 PM 
2011] BOOK REVIEWS 629 
 
something other than the age given in the Constitution16 (p. 103). 
He accepts that “one of the absolute fixed points of our legal 
culture is that we cannot” simply ignore constitutional text (p. 
103). “We cannot make an argument for any constitutional 
principle without purporting to show, at some point, that the 
principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution” (p. 103). 
He devotes Chapter 5 to resolving this paradox: “a dynamic 
common law constitution, and an unchanging but centrally 
important text?” (p. 99). 
Strauss argues that the text is important because “it 
provides a common ground among the American people, and in 
that way makes it possible for us to settle disputes that might 
otherwise be intractable and destructive” (p. 101). The 
Constitution settles any number of important issues regarding 
the structure of the government and the existence of certain 
individual rights that serve as starting points for debate. “The 
central idea is . . . that sometimes it is more important that 
matters be settled than that they be settled right” (p. 104). In 
other words, text sometimes narrows or cabins the extent of our 
disagreements with one another. So “the practical judgment that 
following this text, despite its shortcomings” and not acquiescing 
to dead hand control or even ancestor worship of the Framers is 
why we follow the Constitution (p. 105). 
In accordance with his “common ground” justification for 
following the text, “the words of the Constitution should be 
given their ordinary, current meaning—even in preference to the 
meaning the framers understood” (p. 106). To do otherwise 
would invite disagreement over the Framers’ understandings of 
particular words, which, in turn, would frustrate the reason for 
consulting the text—to narrow areas of disagreement and to 
provide a focal point around which what Cass Sunstein called 
“incompletely theorized agreements” could coalesce17 (pp. 106, 
111). In other words, Strauss would like the text to “matter[] 
most for the least important questions” (p. 110). 
Using original understandings of provisions, moreover, robs 
the Constitution of its particular genius, which for Strauss is that 
 
 16.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative 
who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five years . . . .”); p. 103 (“No one 
seriously suggests that the age limits specified in the Constitution for presidents and 
members of Congress should be interpreted to refer to other than chronological (earth) 
years because life expectancies now are longer . . . .”). 
 17.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 
1733 (1995). 
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the document “is specific where specificity is valuable and 
general where generality is valuable . . .” (p. 112). It seems, in 
other words, to invite the very common law approach that he 
advocates. Originalism, on the other hand, “take[s] general 
provisions and make[s] them specific,” ignoring “the framers’ 
genius . . . in their ability to leave provisions general . . . so as not 
to undermine the document’s ability to serve as common 
ground” (p. 113–14). 
II. PROBLEMS WITH COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
In this Part, I lodge four related objections to Strauss’s 
theory. First, Strauss’s references to the “common law method” 
are very general; it is not clear, exactly, what is involved in 
common law constitutional interpretation, or how we are to 
evaluate whether it is being done well or poorly by judges. 
Second, Strauss assumes, but does not defend, judicial 
supremacy. That assumption, in turn, allows him to sidestep the 
critique that the common law is a poor model for the Supreme 
Court because its decisions may not be reversed by ordinary 
legislative majorities. Third, the originalism with which Strauss 
contrasts CLCI is a caricature. No originalist of whom I’m aware 
holds the views Strauss ascribes to originalism. Further, Strauss’s 
undesirability and impossibility objections to originalism are 
either unpersuasive or overdrawn. The lack of a fine-grained 
discussion of the common law method and his straw-man 
originalism, in turn, make it difficult to say with any certainty 
whether CLCI beats originalism (or any other theory) according 
to Strauss’s own criteria. 
A. WHAT IS THE “COMMON LAW METHOD”? 
Strauss describes the common law as a system “in which 
precedents evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good 
policy” (p. 36). It develops “over time, not at a single moment; it 
can be the evolutionary product of many people, in many 
generations” (p. 37). Its legitimacy stems from its “evolutionary 
origins and its general acceptability to successive generations” 
(pp. 37–38).18 The common law, he adds, “emerges from this 
 
 18.  Another of Strauss’s assumptions is that the common law embodies a kind of 
wisdom of the ages (p. 44). As Adrian Vermeule demonstrates in a book-length critique 
of common law constitutional interpretation, though, these assumptions are highly 
questionable. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009). 
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evolutionary process through the development of a body of 
precedents” (p. 38). Where precedents don’t supply a clear 
answer “the judge will decide the case before her on the basis of 
her views about which decision will be more fair or is more in 
keeping with good social policy” (p. 38). The common law 
method requires the embrace of “humility and cautious 
empiricism” on the part of judges (p. 40). “[W]hile the common 
law does not always provide crystal-clear answers, it is false to 
say that a common law system, based on precedent, is endlessly 
manipulable” (p. 43). 
Describing precedents as “evolving” and resulting principles 
emerging from an “evolutionary process” make judges sound 
almost passive, except when applying a dollop of fairness and 
good policy in situations the precedents don’t address. But the 
analogy to evolution surely obscures more than it illuminates.19 
Strauss never really tells us what this process of evolution looks 
like or the judge’s role in it. Nor does he give clear indications 
when precedents should be regarded as inapplicable, so that a 
judge is free to fall back on her sense of fairness and good policy. 
Compare Strauss’s silence to Edward Levi’s description of the 
common law system: “the doctrine of precedent in which a 
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law 
and then applied to a next similar situation.”20 Levi leaves no 
doubt that there is human agency in this process. As Benjamin 
Cardozo wrote, “We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed 
from the trees.”21 
Cases and principles don’t spontaneously “evolve.” Judges 
and justices, for example, must frame the legal issues; decide 
which cases are relevant to those issues; decide what those cases 
 
 19.  Adrian Vermeule, Living it Up, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.tnr.com/book/review/living-it (book review of GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN 
& CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010); 
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)). In his review, Adrian 
Vermeule dismisses it out of hand, to the extent that Strauss truly intended to analogize 
common law decision-making to biological evolution. “Constitutional Darwinism is a 
non-starter. . . . [T]he process by which constitutional precedents are selected for ongoing 
life, or instead for overruling and death, cannot plausibly be described as a form of 
natural selection.” Id. See also Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living 
Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (illustrating the weaknesses of the 
metaphor). Vermeule, however, gives Strauss the benefit of the doubt, suggested that 
Strauss likely “intends to suggest that constitutional law is intentionally adapted to 
changing circumstances through incremental improvements by successive generations of 
judges. This constitutional Burkeanism,” he concludes, “is a more serious business, and 
Strauss’s view is entirely plausible.” Vermeule, supra. 
 20.  EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1972 ed.). 
 21.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921). 
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say; distinguish or overrule cases that point towards a different 
answer or choose among lines of doctrine that might be in 
tension. Just as judges and lawyers can disagree over the 
conclusions to be drawn from sources of original understanding, 
those attempting CLCI can disagree over the meaning of prior 
cases and the proper level of abstraction at which those 
principles should be derived. The answer to the next case is often 
not found in the prior case. As Charles Fried put it, 
[P]articularistic decisions, moved by the force of urgent 
specifics, may for a time exert their influence in a case-by-case 
accretion of precedents in similar circumstances, but their 
influence cannot forever be exerted in this sideways fashion. 
Eventually they either run out, or, if potent, they invite courts 
to move to higher levels of abstraction, where more general 
propositions are announced, and it is these that begin to take 
over some of the work of deciding cases.22 
Because Strauss wants to convince readers that the common 
law system “restrains judges more effectively than originalism 
does” (p. 36), he seems deliberately to downplay the significant 
discretion that judges have to interpret precedent, derive rules of 
law from prior cases, cast them at a particular level of 
abstraction, and apply them to controversies before them. 
Alternatively, without overruling a prior case apparently on 
point, a court can, as Karl Lewellyn pointed out, distinguish the 
prior case by pointing to differences in the facts.23  He called this 
“strict view” of precedent humorous, illustrating the concept by 
reference to a case expressing a “rule hold[ing] only of 
redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.”24 He 
contrasted his strict view of precedent with a “loose view,”25 
which was: 
 
 22.  CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 189 (2004). 
 23.  K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 65–66 
(10th prtg. 1996 ed.). Llewellyn wrote: 
[I]t is clear that if a later court, in pondering a case substantially equivalent, 
does not like the results achieved by the earlier court, then it may reach a 
contrary decision in either of two ways. Either it may reject the rule laid down 
by court number one; and this is not so likely. Or it may accept that rule as a 
verbal formula, may cite the prior case as authority, and yet interpret the raw 
evidence before it differently, saying that due to the difference in the facts, the 
rule does not apply. 
Id. 
 24.  Id. at 72–73. 
 25.  Id. at 74 (emphasis in original).  
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[T]he view that a court has decided, and decided author–
itatively, any points or all points on which it chose to rest a 
case, or on which to chose [sic], after due argument, to pass. 
No matter how broad the statement, no matter how 
unnecessary on the facts or the procedural issues, if that was 
the rule the court laid down, then that the court has held.26 
Llewellyn emphasized that the strict and loose views of 
precedent were employed by lawyers and judges at the same 
time to “get[] rid of precedents deemed troublesome and . . . for 
making use of precedents that seem helpful.”27 
Strauss’s defense of Roe v. Wade28 in Chapter 4 is an 
example of his quietism about the common law method. “A 
plausible, precedent-based, common law case can be made for a 
woman’s right to reproductive freedom,” he writes (p. 94). First, 
he says, tradition holds that “people have the right to bodily 
integrity” as well as “the right to control the composition of 
one’s family” absent “extraordinary circumstances” (p. 94). 
“Both these traditions reach far back into American law” (pp. 
94–95). Because “it would hardly be controversial for the 
Supreme Court to hold that the government may not invade 
individuals’ bodily integrity by conducting medical experiments 
on people against their will,” and because “a law that specified 
that women of child-bearing age must become pregnant, if they 
are physically able to do so, would . . . rais[e] serious con-
stitutional issues,” despite the absence of language in the 
Constitution prohibiting such laws, Roe is explicable by those 
twin traditions of bodily integrity and the right to family 
composition (p. 95). Q.E.D. 
One problem, of course, is that is not how Roe “evolved.” 
According to the Roe Court, the right to abortion was an aspect 
of a larger “privacy” right that originated in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.29 But the right annunciated in Griswold seemed 
inextricably linked to marriage.30 It was Eisenstadt v. Baird31 that 
 
 26.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 30.  Justice Douglas’s opinion, for example, closed with the observation that the 
case dealt with “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights” and referred to marriage 
“as a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred.” Id. at 486. Earlier, he wrote that “the very idea” of permitting 
“the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use 
of contraceptives” was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship.” Id. at 485–86. 
 31.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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severed the link between the privacy right and the marriage 
relationship. Striking down Massachusetts’ prohibition on the 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons (note the 
difference between that law and the ban in Griswold on the use 
of contraceptives), Justice Brennan wrote that “whatever the 
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the 
rights must be the same for the unmarried and married alike. . . . 
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”32 
Not only did Eisenstadt recast Griswold as a case about 
individual rights, it recharacterized the right itself more 
broadly—as a right of privacy that encompassed not merely the 
right to make choices about becoming pregnant, but also the 
right to bring a pregnancy to term or not. The Court never 
explained why something that was true for married couples must 
be ipso facto true for unmarried individuals. Nor did it justify the 
expansion of the privacy right itself. As Charles Fried has noted, 
Eisenstadt “casually slips in the word ‘bear,’ and so alludes to the 
quite different and much more controversial issue of abortion.”33 
Roe itself then made use of “the subterranean passage Justice 
Brennan had dug between contraception and abortion”34 further 
expanding the privacy right in question, and holding that “[t]his 
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment[] . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment . . . is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”35 As Fried notes, “[j]ust what 
authority the Court was claiming for itself in Roe v. Wade and in 
the name of what doctrine is hard to tell.”36 Whatever it was, 
though, the decision and its reasoning was “a long way from the 
truly anomalous Connecticut statute in Griswold.”37 The actual 
story of Roe must stand as a warning to anyone inclined to take 
seriously Strauss’s assurances about the constraining effects of 
precedent and CLCI.38 
 
 32.  Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
 33.  FRIED, supra note 22, at 191. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 36.  FRIED, supra note 22, at 193. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Nor is Roe necessarily an anomaly. Cases in less controversial areas than 
abortion demonstrate how loosely cases can bind the Court. In Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), for example, the Court invalidated a California law that 
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So much for how Roe actually came about. What about 
Strauss’s attempt to shore up Roe’s foundation by reconstructing 
it upon alleged legal “traditions” of bodily integrity and the right 
to control family size? Strauss’s effort illustrates the point that 
I’m making here: that his theory lacks an account of how to 
choose among competing traditions (or lines of precedent) and 
the appropriate level of abstraction at which to cast whatever 
tradition or precedent is chosen. 
I can think of at least four exceptions to the bodily integrity 
and the controlling-family-size traditions Strauss invokes. First, 
there is the Draft. Government can require its (male) citizens 
literally to put their life on the line for the country or face 
imprisonment. Second is mandatory vaccination. In Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts the Court held that mandatory vaccination against 
smallpox violated neither the letter nor the spirit of the 
Constitution.39 Rejecting the argument that the statute was an 
infringement of personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court responded with a reference to 
conscription: 
The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment . . . consists, in 
part, in the right of a person ‘to live and work where he will’; 
and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his 
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary 
interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take 
his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the 
chance of being shot down in its defense. It is not, therefore, 
true that the power of the public to guard itself against 
imminent danger depends in every case involving the control 
of one’s body upon his willingness to submit to reasonable 
regulations established by the constituted authorities, under 
 
required insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose Holocaust-era 
policies issued in Europe by companies or their affiliates. The Court found that the state 
law conflicted with the executive branch’s policy that conflicts over such insurance 
policies be settled by an international commission. As Mike Ramsey and I showed, 
though, the cases cited in support of the Court’s decision were distinguishable; moreover, 
the Court neglected to discuss relevant precedents that cut against its decision. Brannon 
P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and 
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 874–85 (2004). 
We concluded that “[t]he foreign affairs cases on which Garamendi purported to rely 
simply do not involve close readings of prior cases and applications of the existing rules 
and doctrines to new facts.” Id. at 894. The case, we argued, was “powerful evidence that 
the Court’s prior . . . decisions do not constrain it, or indeed even meaningfully inform its 
subsequent decisions.” Id. at 896. 
 39.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (“Whatever may be thought 
of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palp-
able conflict with the Constitution.”). 
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the sanction of the state, for the purpose of protecting the 
public collectively against such danger.40 
Though it is in bad odor, the Court has never formally 
overruled Buck v. Bell,41 which rejected a constitutional 
challenge to forced sterilization of the “feeble-minded.” Citing 
Jacobson, Justice Holmes wrote that “[t]he principle that 
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting 
the Fallopian tubes,” adding infamously that “[t]hree 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”42 Finally, there is abortion 
itself: after viability (and even in the third trimester under the 
old Roe framework), states may proscribe abortion altogether 
(with exceptions to preserve the life and health of the mother), 
thus forcing a woman to bring the child to term and endure both 
the physical discomfort that attends the last weeks of pregnancy 
as well as the pain of birth. It is also worth noting that the 
statutes on the books limiting or banning abortions when Roe 
was decided constituted an additional exception to those 
traditions. 
Given the existence of those exceptions, how is a judge 
supposed to choose among the competing traditions? Strauss’s 
only response, repeated throughout the book, is that judges 
sometimes need to apply “fairness and good policy” to update 
the law (e.g., pp. 36, 38). But how? If the choice among com-
peting traditions is made by judges applying fairness and good 
policy, it is difficult to see how either precedent or CLCI con-
stitutes even a mild fetter on the Court or how it provides 
transparency and candor as compared to originalism. 
Given that Strauss seeks to prove the superiority of CLCI to 
originalism, it is surprising that he has so little to say about the 
mechanics of his methodology. Analogies and metaphors are no 
substitute for a careful description of the common law method 
itself and the judge’s role in it. By not doing so, he leaves the 
impression it is something of “a machine that would go of itself,” 
to borrow Michael Kammen’s description of the Constitution,43 
whereby principles evolve and emerge ready-made for judicial 
application. When law runs out, well, the judge stands ready with 
fairness and sound policy, thereby moving the law ad astra per 
 
 40.  Id. at 29–30 (citations omitted). 
 41.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 42.  Id. at 207. 
 43.  See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
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aspera.44 By glossing over the choices made in a common law 
system, Strauss makes CLCI sound like sweet reason itself, 
especially when compared to the caricatured originalism Strauss 
deploys as CLCI’s foil. 
B. IMPLICIT JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
CLCI is a theory that assumes judicial supremacy—that the 
Supreme Court is the authoritative interpreter of the 
Constitution and that its decisions bind other governmental 
actors, who are not free to adopt conflicting interpretations. As 
Adrian Vermeule put it in his review of Strauss’s book, “Strauss 
has not fully worked through the basic question of why, under 
[CLCI], the legal system will work best overall if judges have the 
power to review and overturn legislative action” and that 
“constitutional theory should have better foundations than” the 
ones Strauss provides.45 “Strauss describes the common-law 
method,” Vermeule notes, “in terms that make it sound 
distinctively judicial.”46 
This assumption enables Strauss to sidestep a substantial 
objection to his theory: that the common law model is 
inappropriate in a system where judicial decisions are not 
amenable to reversal by ordinary legislative majorities. Because 
judicial decisions are a kind of one-way ratchet, one might argue 
that CLCI has undemocratic and counter-majoritarian effects. 
As noted above, however, Strauss’s response is to shrug and say 
that if there is a problem it is with constitutionalism in general 
and judicial review in particular, not with CLCI.47 But this 
response seems to conflate constitutionalism with judicially-
enforced constitutions and judicial review with judicial 
supremacy. Strauss’s theory places courts—the Supreme Court 
in particular—squarely in the interpretive driver’s seat. As 
Vermeule suggests, Strauss assumes that readers will accept on 
faith that courts are better suited than other branches to perform 
this role. 
CLCI’s juriscentrism is confirmed by recalling Strauss’s list 
of things that “we would have to give up if we were all to 
 
 44.  The phrase is usually translated, “To the stars through adversity.” 
 45.  Vermeule, supra note 19. For a project similar to Strauss’s, which does attempt 
a defense of strong-form judicial review, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009). For 
Strauss’s defense, see supra Part I.D. 
 46.  Vermeule, supra note 19. 
 47.  See supra Part I.D. 
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become originalists” (p. 12). Conceding that Strauss is right that 
the original understanding of the Constitution compelling those 
results,48 however, would not mean that discrimination, 
malapportioned legislatures, or what have you would be fixed in 
the Constitution. At most it might mean that courts would be 
unable to effect changes. Federal, state, and local legislatures 
would be free to enact protections for groups not explicitly 
protected in the United States Constitution. For example, the 
Constitution has not been interpreted by courts to require 
barring employment discrimination based on sexual orientation; 
but state and local governments have stepped in to provide such 
protections.49 In an earlier article, Strauss himself argued that 
even without the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, race discrimination would likely have ended eventually 
anyway.50 There is also the possibility that the Constitution 
would be amended to force change. Though Strauss argues that 
CLCI produces the only meaningful constitutional change in our 
system, evidence exists that Article V has provided meaningful, 
durable constitutional change in the past.51 Moreover, it could be 
that in the absence of robust judicial review Article V would 
have produced more constitutional change than it has to date. 
C. A CARICATURED ORIGINALISM 
Strauss defines originalism as “the view that constitutional 
provisions mean what the people who adopted them—in the 
1790s or 1860s or whenever—understood them to mean” (p. 3). 
Later, he claims that originalists “insist[] that the original 
understandings of constitutional provisions provide answers to 
every dispute about what the Constitution requires” (p. 25). 
Originalism, he writes elsewhere, confines us to the Framers’ 
specific judgments, rather than “leaving [judges] free to interpret 
the [Constitution’s] general provisions” (p. 114). 
 
 48.  To take one example from his list, conventional scholarly wisdom now holds, 
pace Strauss, that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely intended at least 
some (if not all) of the Bill of Rights to be protected. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, 
NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1986). 
 49.  For a list of states having public accommodations statutes that include sexual 
orientation as a protected class, see Elizabeth R. Cayton, Comment, Equal Access to 
Health Care: Sexual Orientation and State Public Accommodation Antidiscrimination 
Statutes, 19 L. & SEXUALITY 193, 195 n.15 (2010). 
 50.  See Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, supra note 7, at 
1484. 
 51.  Denning & Vile, supra note 12. 
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But I am aware of few originalist scholars who believe that 
the Court must apply original understanding in an unmediated 
form. Or who believe that that original understanding is a kind 
of judicial algorithm that produces answers to contemporary 
constitutional controversies. Strauss certainly does not name 
one—a silence facilitated by the lack of footnotes or a list of 
sources at the end of the book. 
Strauss’s crabbed description of originalism ignores the 
outpouring of recent literature expressing a variety of views on 
what counts as sources of meaning for ascertaining the original 
understanding of constitutional provisions.52 In contrast to earlier 
originalist theories that seemed to privilege the views of the 
Framers,53 much recent originalism scholarship endorses what it 
terms “the original public understanding,” based on, among 
other things, contemporary usage, in addition to the usual 
sources, such as the records from the Philadelphia Convention, 
state ratifying conventions, the records of the Reconstruction 
Congress, and the like.54 
His insistence that originalists expect specific answers to 
contemporary constitutional questions similarly elides the 
distinction between the fixing of constitutional meaning and the 
extrapolation of doctrinal rules implementing that meaning—
between what Mitchell Berman has termed “constitutional 
operative propositions” and “decision rules.”55 Take the Equal 
Rights Amendment as an example. Strauss claims that no 
understandings emerged in the debates over that amendment on 
questions such as whether the ERA would outlaw single-sex 
education.56 For Strauss, this “proves” that originalism is 
unworkable because history often fails to provide ready-made 
answers to controversies that arise later. Leaving aside for a 
moment whether “understandings” about the ERA materialized 
or not,57 Strauss is conflating the use of originalism to fix 
 
 52.  For a good, if critical, summary, see Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 53.  For a clever critique of this earlier originalism, see Boris I. Bittker, The 
Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 
235 (1989). 
 54.  See generally Symposium, Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
491 (2009). 
 55.  Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); 
see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What 
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005); see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).  
 56.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 57.  The evidence suggests that understandings did emerge that the results Strauss 
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constitutional meaning and the implementation of that meaning 
through judicial doctrine. As Mitchell Berman has 
demonstrated, however one arrives at constitutional meaning, 
there is still a second step in which courts have to fashion tools 
that enable judges to use that meaning in the resolution of 
specific cases.58 Even provisions with self-evident meaning (e.g., 
Presidents must be at least thirty-five years old59) cannot be 
directly applied—courts have to apply some decision rule 
specifying whether the age threshold has been met.60 Few 
originalists would claim that to fashion doctrinal rules to render 
original understanding useful is to abandon original 
understanding.61 
Strauss’s claim that originalists are committed to the 
Framers’ specific applications of their principles is also false. As 
Mitchell Berman notes in an article otherwise harshly critical of 
originalism, “the only commentators who take [original 
application originalism] seriously are those aiming to attack it. 
Leading originalists have unambiguously repudiated it for 
years.”62 
To be fair, Strauss confesses to presenting an unnuanced 
picture of originalism (pp. 10–11), defending his presentation on 
 
mentions were possible under the ERA, and that possibility played a significant role in 
its eventual defeat. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 at 410–11 (1996) (discussing the concerns raised by 
opponents of ERA regarding, inter alia, unisex bathrooms and assurances provided by 
supporters that the ERA would not have mandated such things); RICHARD B. 
BERNSTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 142–43 (1993) 
(describing “insistent repetition of alleged horrors that ERA, interpreted by an ‘ultra-
liberal’ Court, might foster: drafting women into combat forces, unisex bathrooms, 
homosexual marriages, and the like. . . . [T]he parade of horribles . . . tainted ERA 
beyond repair”).  
 58.  Further, it is hard to see that CLCI is a marked improvement on this score. 
After all, the common law method requires judges to extract principles from a case or 
group of cases for prospective application. See supra notes 28–44 and accompanying text. 
 59.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 60.  Berman says that the default rule is “preponderance of the evidence.” Berman, 
supra note 55, at 11, 68.  
 61.  Randy Barnett, who is an originalist, has likewise distinguished between 
constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction,” which describes roughly 
the same distinction between fixing meaning and operationalizing that meaning through 
judicial doctrine. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (2004). Even older originalists, like Robert Bork, 
recognized that “‘most doctrine is merely the judge-made superstructure that implements 
basic constitutional principles’” and was in no way inconsistent with originalism. ROBERT 
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 167 
(1990) (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., 
concurring)). 
 62.  Berman, supra note 52, at 28. 
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the grounds that with originalism, it’s all or nothing. Some 
practitioners, he notes, “actually define ‘original meaning’ in a 
way that ends up making originalism indistinguishable from a 
form of living constitutionalism” (pp. 10–11).63 Strauss argues 
that those, like Justice Scalia, who declare themselves to be 
“fainthearted originalist[s],” and would, for example, permit 
well-entrenched precedent to trump original understanding, are 
not really originalists either and that such concessions are fatal 
to originalism (p. 17). Strauss writes, “if following a theory 
consistently would make you a nut, isn’t that a problem with the 
theory?” (p. 17). The problem with soft originalism “is that it 
gives away most of the qualities that purported to make 
originalism appealing in the first place,” like the constraint of 
individual discretion (p. 17). If you concede you would abandon 
it sometimes, then questions arise: “When?” and “What do you 
employ instead of originalism?” He writes that “[t]he 
challenge . . . is to answer these questions without making 
yourself vulnerable to the same objections that are routinely 
leveled against living constitutionalism: when push comes to 
shove, you’re just going to do what seems right to you, instead of 
following the law” (p. 17). 
But this objection can be turned back on CLCI itself. For 
example, in Chapter 5 Strauss concedes that it is at times good 
and right that we follow text or original understanding. Yet, he 
does not suggest that his concession is fatal to his theory or 
makes him any less committed to CLCI. Moreover, those like 
Justice Scalia who admit a willingness to abandon originalism on 
occasion do so in the name of stare decisis, something one would 
think Strauss would applaud given both his fears that originalism 
would result in all the terrible things he lists in Chapter 1 as well 
as his belief that it’s good for the Court to follow precedent. 
Originalism, like the Constituton itself, need not be a suicide 
pact. 
D. ON THE UNDESIRABILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OBJECTIONS 
Strauss’s main objections to originalism—that it is both 
undesirable and impossible—are both overdrawn and even 
contradict one another. First, if the Framers’ intentions are truly 
unknowable, then it makes no sense to indict originalism on 
consequentialist grounds as he does in Chapter 1.64 The 
 
 63.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 64.  See supra Part I.A. 
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normative argument that originalism would produce undesirable 
results must assume that those are, in fact, outcomes produced 
by the original understanding. But if original intent or original 
understanding is beyond the grasp of scholars, lawyers, and 
judges, then no such outcomes are possible or plausible. 
Strauss also cites the dead-hand objection as another of 
originalism’s normatively undesirable consequences. But I’m not 
sure I really understand this objection. Adhering to precedent 
seems to involve no less of a submission to the past than 
adherence to the original understanding of constitutional 
provisions. We obey statutes that were written a long time ago as 
well. Strauss distinguishes stare decisis from originalism by 
claiming proponents of the latter do so out of quasi-religious or 
mystical ancestor worship, while he would respect precedent on 
pragmatic grounds. But adherents of originalism, no less than 
proponents of CLCI, could similarly ground their theory. 
Originalists might claim that it makes sense to resolve the 
tension between judicial review and democracy by curbing 
judicial discretion in exercise of the former by hewing closely to 
the original understanding of constitutional provisions. That 
way, the argument runs, you can be sure that you enforce the 
Constitution while reducing the instances of interference with 
policy choices made by elected officials. No mystical or quasi-
religious veneration is required! The only requirement is just a 
belief that Article VI’s reference to “this Constitution” means 
the one written and ratified in 1789 (or 1791 or 1868), not what 
one wishes it meant or would like it to mean today. Moreover, 
since Strauss himself concedes that it is sometimes necessary or 
useful to follow text, his dead-hand objection could be expanded 
to condemn constitutionalism in toto. To the extent it does, it 
surely proves too much, as Madison himself pointed out to 
Jefferson, who thought constitutions ought to expire every 
generation or so. 
As for the impossibility critique: saying that recovery of 
original understanding is impossible is a pretty radical attack on 
the historical enterprise. What Strauss really means is that it is 
impossible for lawyers and judges to do so, which might be recast 
as an institutional competence objection. Granted, most lawyers 
and judges are not trained historians, but that does not mean 
either that (1) their efforts to do history are designed to hide 
policy preferences, or (2) that CLCI is superior because it 
“requires judges and lawyers to be, well, judges and lawyers” (p. 
43). 
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Strauss also objects that were original understandings within 
our capabilities, they would still not help, because they don’t 
answer the questions that come up in litigation. As noted above, 
this collapses any distinction between constitutional meaning 
and the doctrinal rules to implement that meaning, denies that 
the formulation of doctrinal rules is compatible with originalism, 
or both. Moreover, CLCI is hardly an improvement. Knowing 
that Griswold v. Connecticut held that states could not prohibit 
married couples from using contraceptives tells a court nothing 
about the state’s ability to prohibit the sale of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons,65 or whether the state can regulate the sexual 
morality of its citizens.66 
E. COMPARING CLCI AND ORIGINALISM 
It is difficult to tell whether CLCI is more workable than 
originalism, because it is not clear, exactly, what CLCI involves. 
Saying that it allows lawyers and judges to be lawyers and judges 
is, of course, tautological. Similarly, if you reject the Jeffersonian 
“dead hand” argument—or at least if you fail to see why 
precedent is not as subject to that argument as originalism, you 
might question whether CLCI is clearly superior on justifiability 
as well. 
On descriptive superiority, however, Strauss seems to be on 
stronger ground. There is no doubt that most Supreme Court 
opinions on constitutional questions do not start—and have not 
started—by reasoning from originalist first principles. Opinions 
like District of Columbia v. Heller67 are the exception, rather 
than the rule. More common are opinions like the ones in, say, 
Gonzales v. Raich,68 in which the majority and the dissenting 
opinions jousted over which precedents were most relevant to 
the resolution of the issue before the Court. And Strauss is 
certainly correct that First Amendment doctrine has moved 
 
 65.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 66.  Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring), and id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (assuming that it can), with Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577 (2003) (holding that morality alone is an insufficient 
justification for regulating consensual same-sex sexual activity). 
 67.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to private gun ownership for self-defense; 
invalidating the District of Columbia’s gun control ordinance that made illegal ownership 
of a handgun for self-defense). 
 68.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (sustaining the application of the 
Controlled Substances Act to non-commercial, locally-grown possession and consump-
tion of marijuana for medical purposes, as permitted by state law). 
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afield of the Framers’ likely intended application of the 
Amendment.69 Still, “ought” does not necessarily follow from 
“is.” It still remains to be proven that CLCI produces better or 
more accurate results over the run of cases, according to some 
measure, than originalism does.70 
I have my doubts whether CLCI would result in more 
candid opinions as well. Perhaps the common law method would 
be an improvement if judges would signal that lines of precedent 
did not control, or were in tension, and thus a decision would be 
made according to notions of fairness and good policy. But I 
cannot think of a majority Supreme Court opinion on a 
contentious issue that has said so. More common are dis-
ingenuously broad readings of cases that ignore limiting 
language or, conversely, parsimonious readings that Llewellyn 
mocked as announcing a principle that applies only to red-
headed Walpoles driving pale magenta Buicks. Seeing such 
behavior, I am occasionally as inclined to view case law as a fig 
leaf for a preferred outcome as Strauss is suspicious of the “law 
office” history allegedly accompanying originalist opinions. At 
the very least, it is rarely clear which precedents control, 
particularly when lines of precedent are in tension with one 
another, if they don’t flatly conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
The Living Constitution is written for a general, not a 
specialized, audience. I would highly recommend it as an 
antidote to some simplistic popular critiques of the Supreme 
Court. As is his hallmark, Strauss’s writing is clear and concise. 
His logic and argumentation are downright seductive. 
However, the verdict on CLCI as an, or the, alternative 
contender to theories of original understanding will have to 
await a more complete treatment. I close with three suggestions 
for that future work. First, a more precise description of the 
common law method is essential. Strauss seems to assume that 
there is only one such method and that lawyers will, to coin a 
phrase, “know it when they see it.” But metaphors involving 
evolution and talk of the wisdom of the ages obscure the myriad 
choices that judges have when framing issues, choosing among 
 
 69.  See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 70.  For doubts about the ability of CLCI to deliver on its epistemic claims, see 
VERMEULE, supra note 18. 
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lines of relevant precedent, synthesizing those precedents in that 
line into legal principles, and applying those principles. 
Second, I agree with Adrian Vermeule that the judicial 
supremacy on which CLCI depends demands a stronger defense. 
Why is it that courts, the Supreme Court in particular, are 
institutionally capable of identifying, transmitting, and updating 
high constitutional principles? Why is it not fatal to the common 
law analogy that common law courts were subject to reversal by 
legislatures? 
Finally, Strauss should eschew the straw man originalism 
invoked in The Living Constitution in favor of the original 
understanding theories that scholars actually propound. He 
should at least be able to cite originalist scholars who subscribe 
to a version of originalism that, for example, expects history to 
dictate the precise outcomes of current cases. 
 
 
